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ABSTRACT 
Mergers have been a frequent phenomenon in higher education in 
the last quarter century. The conventional wisdom is that mergers are 
undertaken mainly for economic reasons, either to expand markets or to 
reduce costs. About four out of five college or university mergers sur-
vive. In the for-profit sector the comparable rate is closer to two out of 
five. From this one might conclude that the future for mergers among 
colleges and universities is robust. If, however, the principal purpose of 
mergers is economic efficiency, there logically ought to be a point 
beyond which the efficacy of merger will begin to decline. There is, 
however, another motive for merger, which is unrelated to economic 
efficiency. Mergers can produce greater diversity of programs and ser-
vices, both among individual colleges and universities and within sys-
tems of postsecondary educat ion. If divers i f icat ion is the primary 
purpose of merger, the future might look different and might depend on 
new ways of identifying peers and partners for merger. This essay exam-
ines the expectations that are held for mergers, the realism of those 
expectations, and the means by which partners in mergers are identified 
and selected. It concludes with the suggestions that diversification may 
replace efficiency as the main stimulus of merger, and that, as the choice 
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is made between efficiency and merger, institutions and systems of post-
secondary education may try other, less permanent, forms of inter-insti-
tutional cooperation before committing to merge. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Depuis 25 ans, les f u s i o n s sont un p h é n o m è n e f r équen t dans 
l ' ense ignement supérieur. Selon les idées reçues, elles surviennent 
principalement pour des raisons économiques, soit pour développer le 
marché ou soit pour réduire les dépenses. Environ quatre fusions de 
collèges ou d'universités sur cinq survivent, alors que dans le secteur à 
but lucratif, le taux se rapproche de deux sur cinq. Ces chiffres pourraient 
amener à conclure que l ' aven i r des fu s ions parmi les co l lèges et 
universités est solide. Toutefois, si l 'efficacité économique est le principal 
objectif des fusions, il devrait logiquement y avoir un point au-delà 
duquel l 'eff icaci té d 'une fusion commence à faiblir. Or, les fusions 
reposent sur un autre motif, sans lien avec l'efficacité économique. Elles 
peuvent en effet engendrer une diversité plus grande des programmes et 
services, aussi bien parmi chaque établissement collégial et universitaire 
que d a n s les s y s t è m e s d ' e n s e i g n e m e n t p o s t s e c o n d a i r e s . Si la 
diversification est le principal but d 'une fusion, l'avenir peut se présenter 
différemment et dépendre de nouvelles méthodes pour trouver des pairs 
et des partenaires. Cet article analyse les attentes que provoquent les 
fusions, la mesure dans laquelle ces attentes sont réalistes et les moyens 
ut i l i sés pour t rouve r et cho i s i r des pa r t ena i r e s à une f u s i o n . En 
conc lus ion , l ' au teur suggère que l ' e f f i cac i t é peut fa i re place à la 
diversification en tant que principal incitatif de fusionnement, et qu'avant 
de choisir entre efficacité et fusion et de s 'engager à s'amalgamer, les 
établissements et les systèmes d'enseignement postsecondaires pourraient 
mettre à l'essai d'autres possibilités de coopération. 
WHAT DO WE WANT MERGERS TO DO? 
Since the mid-1980s the principal interest in merger in higher educa-
tion has been financial. In this respect, the differences between the cor-
porate sec tor and the educat ional sector, and between the publ ic 
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non-profit sector and the private for-profit sector have not been fundamen-
tally different. Merger is seen as a means of promoting efficiency in pro-
duction and ensuring an optimal allocation of scarce resources. In other 
words, mergers allow the reduction of inputs without reducing the level of 
output. Many mergers have met those expectations. Others have not. 
Some mergers fail because the concept of efficiency through econ-
omy of scale is poorly understood. Others fail for the same reason that 
some marriages fail: the partners were incompatible and could not be 
reconciled. Some mergers that are essentially corporate take-overs fail 
because they were never intended to succeed; their objective was to 
eliminate competition and strengthen the dominant partner in the merger. 
Diversity can be defined in many different ways (Birnbaum 1983). It 
can be about institutional form. It can be about equity when it addresses 
the composition of student populations and of faculty complements. It 
can be about the availability of programs, the quality of programs, and 
the ways and means by which programs are delivered. The list could be 
longer. For example, in South Africa mergers are said to be "transi-
tional" to indicate their role in social, political, and economic integration 
after the eradication of apartheid (Jansen 2002). In this case merger is 
not only a form of diversity; it is also a means of creating broader diver-
sity. Diversity, as it relates to merger, is usually about institutional forms, 
arrays of programs offered, and response to student demand. 
This duality of purpose between efficiency and diversity poses sev-
eral problems. The first is that when one asks about the future of merger, 
its success or failure, the answers can be different depending on the 
expectations that were held for merger in the first place. The second is 
that inherently one purpose of merger — efficiency and productivity — 
can offset the other — innovation and diversity — by discouraging com-
petit ion. Another problem involves the level of diversity at which 
merger plays a role. These levels can be described as across and within 
diversities (Cowen, 2002). Let's say that within a system of higher edu-
cation there are, among several institutions, two institutions each with 
different specializations or strengths. When those two institutions merge, 
the new institution that is created will be more diverse internally or 
within itself because it will have drawn on the special programs or 
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strengths of the two founding institutions. But across the system there 
will be less diversity because two of its constituent institutions have 
become one and, more signif icantly, have become more alike one 
another. This explains the third problem: is the purpose of some mergers 
to change the shape or diversity of overall systems of higher education 
or is it to change only the two partners in merger? These are distinctions 
that, so far, research about merger has not thoroughly examined. 
MONEY TALKS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MERGER 
More often than not finance motivates mergers and defines what 
they can achieve (Millett, 1976). The value of a merger (and of most 
other forms of cooperation or partnership between postsecondary institu-
tions) in the first and often only instance is basically practical and in 
many cases measurable, in expectations if not in outcome. One observer 
explained the value this way: 
[Institutional] cooperation is one of those concepts, which 
like a teaspoon or an umbrella, but unlike an earthquake or a 
buttercup, are definable primarily by the use or purpose which 
they serve. Although there are persons for whom cooperation 
seems to have inherent values as a desirable way of life, insti-
tutional cooperation has merit only as it contributes to the 
purposes of the institutions involved — if it makes them more 
efficient. (Stewart, 1961) 
More recent studies have confirmed the findings that finance drives 
many mergers in higher education (Eastman & Lang, 2001; Geodegebuure, 
1992). Even when financial concerns do not motivate merger, they may still 
be important ingredients in the success or failure of mergers. 
Although the financial motivations for merger differ from case to 
case, certain patterns are discernible. Moreover and equally important, 
the motivations often can just as readily explain the formation of a con-
sortium or a federation or some other form of inter-institutional coopera-
tion as a merger. Further, in the case of public institutions, these motives 
are often shared with governments, many of which actively promote or 
at least smooth the way for mergers and cooperation. What are some of 
these motives? 
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Looking Up and Looking Down: The Perspective of Scale 
There is an intuitive and sometimes demonstrable view that mergers 
can realize economies of scale (Brinkman & Leslie, 1986; Sears 1983). 
A corollary of that view is that size matters, and that at some level of 
scale, as in the old saying about marriage, two can live as cheaply as 
one. It should not be surprising, however, that institutions of different 
sizes view merger differently, although they both may be attracted to 
merger in order to reduce or minimize costs by capturing economies of 
scale (Lang, 2002). 
Looking upward towards larger partners, smaller and more special-
ized institutions perceive merger as offering several opportunities: 
• Truly new revenue may be generated from new programs that 
could only be offered through merger. 
• They want to secure net new resources for their programs 
and services. More often than not, the net gain is due to 
reduced unit costs than to addi t ional revenue. Thus the 
"new" revenue is only notional; the real source of financial 
gain is reallocated saving. 
• They want to benefit financially from government incentives 
to merge with larger institutions. 
• Depending on the larger institution's reasons for considering 
merger, the larger institution may be prepared to direct addi-
tional resources to the smaller institution. Those resources 
usually will be budgetary allocations but in some case they 
may involve access to better facilities and services than the 
smaller institution could have afforded itself. 
• In " t iered" jurisdict ions, merger may relocate the smaller 
institution to a more favourable location in a funding formula. 
• They want to be less lop-sided in terms of program costs. 
• They want to achieve critical mass in small areas of specialization. 
• Their accumulated debt may assumed by their partner in 
merger or by the government. 
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Some of these reasons could, of course, apply to any merger, but they 
apply more often to smaller more specialized institutions. In some cases 
in which merger is promoted or required by government, merger as a 
matter of public policy has been directed expressly at institutions below a 
specified size. This was the case in The Netherlands (Goedegebuure, 
1992) and in Australia, al though in Australia institutional size was 
expressed in ranges of funding units (Dawkins 1988; Ramsey, 1989). 
Intuition also suggests that the larger partner in a merger will be 
motivated less than the smaller partner by financial considerations. In 
many cases this intuition coincides with reality, but not always. First, 
"large" and "small" are relative terms. While a college with 2,000 stu-
dents will appear small in comparison to a university with 5,000 stu-
dents, the difference in size between them might not be sufficiently 
significant to alter their unit costs of instruction were they to merge. 
There is evidence that significant economies of scale do not begin until 
enrolment reaches about 9,000 and begin to diminish after about 20,000. 
So, economy of scale is significant within a range of approximately 
9,000 to 20,000. Outside that range, it makes little difference (Layard 
1974; Patterson, 1999; Schumacher, 1983; Toutkoushian, 1999). Thus 
the college with 2,000 students and the university with 5,000 students 
are both "small" in terms of economy of scale, and, for that reason, a 
merger between them would not produce much saving. 
Further to the point, the college with 2,000 students might have five 
different faculties while the university with 5,000 students might have 
only two. In that case the smaller institution is the more complex. 
C o m p l e x i t y may d r ive cos t s m o r e than a b s o l u t e s ize (Na t iona l 
Commission on the Cost of Higher Education, 1998), as it often does in 
for-profit firms (Lawler & Mohrman, 1996). This conflation of size and 
complexity can result in diversity posing as efficiency. 
Second, economy of scale is not infinite. There is a point at which 
size no longer confers financial advantage, and beyond which size can be 
a financial liability (Blau, 1994; Patterson, 1999). Nevertheless, larger 
institutions in mergers share some objectives with their smaller partners: 
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• They may wish to benefit from government incentives that 
encourage merger. Some government merger schemes offer 
more to larger "host" institutions. 
• They may have small, highly specialized programs that, on 
their own, are as uneconomic as those in smaller institutions. 
• They may gain additional revenue from new programs that 
merger either makes possible at a lower marginal cost than 
the larger institution could realize on its own. 
• Because of the presumption of economy of scale, larger insti-
tutions assume that they can offer the programs of the smaller 
institution at lower cost, thus producing savings for realloca-
tion. This is also the reason for governments ' extending 
stronger incentives to merge to larger institutions. 
• They may gain access to highly specialized facilities, some of 
which might be underutilized. 
What Do Governments Want Mergers To Do? 
Formally and legally mergers are among institutions, but in the case 
of publicly funded colleges and universities government almost always 
plays a role in merger. Sometimes the government's role is extremely 
proactive as when a government forces merger. Many mergers among 
public colleges and universities are involuntary; they are the creations 
of government and often have the characteristics of corporate take-
overs and acquisitions. In some cases government may force merger but 
not determine who the partners should be. In other cases, government 
may establish strong incentives to merge. Those incentives may be pos-
itive — financial inducements are offered — or they may be negative as 
when financial penalties are imposed on institutions that choose to 
remain independent. Finally, a government may stimulate merger by 
signaling that it would approve a merger on certain terms, or by indicat-
ing that an institution in financial stress will not be rescued by special 
government intervention. 
For mergers among public colleges and universities, then, it is not 
logically or practically possible to set the objectives of government 
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aside. Often governments want the same things that the institutions -
large or small — want: 
• Governments want new programs and a relatively low mar-
ginal cost instead of at an average cost. Here governments are 
victims of their own funding formulas that inherently fund at 
the average. Merger can make the marginal costs of new pro-
grams lower. 
• Merger can especially reduce the capital costs of new pro-
grams as the sunk costs of previous investments can be more 
efficiently utilized. 
• Governments are driven towards economies of scale just as 
individual institutions are, and perhaps more so. 
There are some objectives, however, that are of greater interest to 
government than to public colleges and universities. These objectives are 
not necessarily antithetical to the interests of the institutions, but they 
may be of less value to them. 
• Systems of higher education, particularly in older jurisdic-
tions, may not be rational or efficient in terms of pubic policy 
because, in the first instance, there may have been no public 
policy when some of the institutions that make up the system 
were founded. Or public policy may have changed; an exam-
ple is the shift to mass higher education with very high rates 
of participation. 
• Demand may have shifted to the extent that certain institu-
tions — typically in under-populated areas — that were viable 
under conventional funding formulas cease to be viable. 
Merger in these cases may be a more attractive alternative 
than receivership or anomalous funding. 
• While affordability is of concern at both the institutional level 
and the government level, the government perspective is dif-
ferent. In most jurisdictions governments fund colleges and 
universities by block transfer grants; that is, with a few excep-
tions, they do not specify how an institution should spend the 
public funding that is made available to it. This causes gov-
ernments, when faced with affordability problems, to tend to 
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think in terms of simple unit costs like funding per student. 
Their own funding formulas draw them to such a perspective, 
draw them to thinking of merger as a way of moving all insti-
tutions to an average unit cost. This may happen in either 
direction: college to university or university to college. 
• On self-reflection, some governments recognize that they may 
not have sufficient time or sapience to make sound decisions 
about all of the public colleges and universities for which they 
are responsible, particularly smaller and more specialized 
institutions. Merger seen from this perspective is an organiza-
tional device for delegating or narrowing some responsibility 
to a lower level, specifically to larger institutions that become 
hosts through merger to smaller, more specialized institutions. 
(Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs 
1996; van Ravens, 1995) 
MERGERS AND DIVERSITY 
Although less frequently cited than economic and financial objec-
tives, we also often want mergers to create diversity where it otherwise 
might not be possible. The merger of two absolutely identical institu-
tions would be so pointless as to be an oxymoron. Of course, the random 
or arbitrary merger of different institutions might be equally pointless. 
To return to some of the objectives that colleges, universities, and 
governments hold for merger as a means of reducing and minimizing 
costs it can be seen that diversity is embedded in some of them. For 
example, when governments are concerned about their ability to make 
sound decisions about the management of smaller and more specialized 
institutions, they are inherently concerned about diversity, because it is 
diversity that makes those institutions expensive to manage. 
Larger institutions naturally tend towards diversity and comprehen-
siveness, and therefore often regard a merger as a form of corporate 
take-over. As they do, they become concerned about balance and filling 
programmatic voids. Merger is a means of filling a void at lower cost, 
especially capital cost. This explains why in a merger a larger institution 
may be willing to assume the debt of a smaller institution. In practical 
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terms, the larger institution would be buying additional programs for the 
cost of their debt. In certain cases that could be a bargain. Here again, 
the objective is in the first instance diversity. Merger is an efficient and 
economic means towards the end of diversity. 
Governments sometimes want new programs in response to expand-
ing demands for accessibility. But they sometimes want those programs 
in order to expand diversity, either for competitive reasons or for reasons 
of public policy. An example of the first expansion of diversity is the 
addition of programs in areas that enhance global economic competitive-
ness, as in the case of the merger in Canada of the Technical University 
of Nova Scotia and Dalhousie University. Examples of the latter are the 
array of " t rans i t iona l" mergers imposed by government on South 
African colleges and universities, and the "upgrading" that characterized 
some of the mergers in Australia and Canada as sub-baccalaureate pro-
grams in Nursing were merged into universities. 
So, a second but not necessarily subordinate expectation of mergers 
is to produce diversity. This is easier said than done, particularly in con-
trast to the expectations about economy and efficiency. Mergers of insti-
tutions with complementary missions and strengths are more successful 
than mergers of institutions that are fundamentally different from one 
another (Eastman & Lang, 2001 ). This means two things. First, the role 
that mergers can play in promoting diversity needs to be clarified and 
separated from the role that they play in promoting economy and effi-
ciency. The roles are not only different; they are often mutually exclu-
sive and conscious choices have to be made about which objective 
should have priority. For example, if the optimal size of universities in 
t e r m s of cos t is s l i gh t ly g r e a t e r than 2 0 , 0 0 0 ( P a t t e r s o n , 1999; 
Toutkoushian, 1999) many systems of higher education should have a 
few large institutions and no small or middle-size institutions, which in 
turn would mean less diversity. 
This is a choice that governments, when they become involved in 
merger, often overlook or avoid. Second, more must be known about the 
influences that engender diversity. How does one recognize and plan for 
diversity? Mergers for which the objective is greater diversity must be 
carefully planned, especially in terms of identifying institutions that will 
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make good partners in merger. The track record of mergers in the public 
sector — not only the higher educational sector —indicates that their suc-
cess rate depends on the rationale by which institutions are selected as 
partners in merger. "Mix and match" may work in the fashion industry but 
it doesn't work for mergers. 
Diversity: What Is It and From Where Does It Come? 
Diversity is a policy objective that most systems of higher education 
pursue, either collectively or institution by institution. The natural incli-
nation of individual colleges and universities is to become more diverse, 
usually by adding programs. There are several different concepts of 
diversity and of what causes it. Robert Birnbaum (1983), who has writ-
ten extensively about diversity in higher education, for example, identi-
fied at least six different kinds of diversity and two different paradigms 
— "natural selection" and "resource dependence." He and others further 
observed that none of the conventional, broadly applied classification 
schemes for identifying diversity satisfactorily accounts for all institu-
tional characteristics (Birnbaum, 1983; Huisman, 1998). 
There are other paradigms. In terms of typologies of institutions and 
the degrees of diversity that they represent, the paradigm of natural 
selection is very powerful. Natural selection is essentially the application 
of a Darwinian model of an ecological system to institutions of higher 
education, or more exactly to groups of institutions just as there are mul-
tiple organisms in an ecosystem. How does the natural selection model 
explain inter-institutional cooperation through merger? Merger may be a 
means, perhaps the only means, of institutional survival. Like any 
species in an ecosystem, colleges and universities will seek to survive, 
and will choose change over the status quo in order to do so. The com-
plexity of ecosystems, perhaps like systems of postsecondary education, 
can, on the one hand, be so great as to be less than comprehensible 
while, on the other hand, reflect the essential role that specialization and 
diversity play in maintaining the health of the system. Seen from this 
perspective, any system of higher education contains a plethora of 
unique niches that are constantly changing. Merger in this sense can be 
regarded as the institutional equivalent of genetic variability. Each 
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merger represents a unique combination of institutional characteristics that 
together move the participating institutions to fill a new niche by evolution. 
But as in an ecological system not all species survive. Some fail to 
evolve and die. Some evolve but disappear into merger. Moreover, not 
all that survive do so by symbiosis. Some evolve without cooperation 
with others. But in those cases that do involve formal cooperation, either 
in the biological sense or the organizational sense, the success of merger 
depends on the compatibility of the two institutions. Success in a merger 
does not occur randomly. Some institutions make a good fit together 
while others do not. 
Yet another paradigm is resource dependence. Resource dependence 
is, at least superficially, similar to the paradigm of natural selection: the 
fundamental objective of the organization is to survive. The resource 
dependence paradigm ties survival, however, to a single factor: resources 
or money (Birnbaum, 1983; Goedegebuure, 1992). That factor includes 
as well the authority or franchise to raise or claim money (Goedegebuure, 
1992). It should not be surprising then that in the case of public colleges 
and universities the role and posture of government is paramount because 
government is the source of the majority of funding on which the institu-
tions depend. In these cases, the difference between voluntary and invol-
untary merger might be moot. 
Nor should it be surprising that merger seen from the perspective of 
the resource dependence borrows from the idiom of monopolies. For 
example, a merger that involves institutions that operate in a similar 
field and offer similar programs (or "products") might be described as 
"horizontal" while a merger that involves institutions in a similar field 
but which offer different products might be described as "vert ical" 
(Steiner, 1975). The analogy to economic monopolies of course is not 
perfect. But that is not the point. The point is that the motivation to 
form monopolies through merger is to secure and control resources, 
and , o n c e they are s e c u r e d , to p r o t e c t t hem f r o m c o m p e t i t i o n . 
Protection from competition may enhance the security of resources but 
may also discourage diversity and innovation. 
Joseph Ben-David (1972) argued that diversity is the product of com-
petition, and that competition is greatest when colleges and universities 
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are relatively independent. Roger Geiger (1986) came to a similar conclu-
sion in his study of the differences between public and private sectors in 
higher education. This would imply, further, a paradigm rooted in organi-
zational behaviour and system structure. Moreover, the implication is a 
paradigm inhospitable to voluntary merger. 
So, while the competition paradigm and the resource dependence par-
adigm share a common ground in the marketplace, they explain the phe-
nomenon of merger quite differently. One depends on the marketplace to 
determine how institutions change and adapt through merger while the 
other seeks by merger to insulate institutions from the marketplace, and in 
particular from the possible loss of resources to the marketplace. 
The final paradigm that explains institutional diversity might not be 
a paradigm at all, but it is important, particularly in juxtaposition with 
the other paradigms, especially as they relate to involuntary mergers. A 
conundrum that confronts several of the other paradigms that attempt to 
explain inst i tut ional d i f fe ren t ia t ion and varying pos tures towards 
merger is that the shape and composition of the political jurisdictions in 
which postsecondary educational systems function are not themselves 
the product of, for example, natural selection or competition. History, 
culture, language, and geography are far more frequent determinants of 
political jurisdictions. Any one of these factors can explain certain cir-
cumstances that might lead to merger or discourage it. This paradigm 
may explain, for example, the path taken by South African colleges and 
universities towards merger. Patterns and forms of merger under this 
paradigm are to a very large extent determined by government policy, 
and are virtually synonymous with reorganization and restructuring by 
government fiat (Jansen 2002). 
The Use of Peer Selection Methodologies: Finding Partners for Merger 
Peer selection, as a policy issue, began to grow in importance as 
interest in accountability and performance indicators grew, and as col-
leges and universities came under greater pressure to perform efficiently, 
which is also an objective of merger. It is therefore also inherently 
important to merger as a means of determining which combinations of 
institutions would produce the greatest efficiency or diversity, or both. 
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(n order to make informed decisions about strategy and resource 
allocations individual institutions might quite legitimately wish to con-
struct comparisons with other institutions for the purposes of bench-
mark ing . Benchmark ing is not necessar i ly about p e r f o r m a n c e or 
accountability. It can also be a means of identifying the differences and 
similarities that make successful mergers possible. It is important to 
understand that a methodology by which peers are selected is also a 
methodology for identifying institutions that are not peers, and, more 
specifically, for indicating the area in which they are unalike. So, when 
one talks about peer selection in the context of merger the implication is 
not that peers necessarily make good partners in merger. 
Comparisons made ad hoc, either because data are readily available 
or because comparisons with certain other institutions produce intuitively 
desirable results, are inherently unreliable and cannot serve accountability 
and management well. The same can be said about mergers: partners 
should not be selected only because they are willing, available, and geo-
graphically nearby. "Because they are there" might be a plausible reason 
to climb mountains, but it is a very bad reason to select partners for 
merger. Convenience and politically useful results should not form the 
basis of peer selection or the selection of partners for merger Yet, in the 
absence of systematic means of determining peers and partners for 
merger, that is an entirely possible and unfortunately misleading result. 
Peer Selection and Diversity: Where Do They Intersect For Mergers? 
Peer selection is as much an art as a science. The ultimate objective of 
any methodology for determining peers for comparison should be to 
ensure that the institutions are sufficiently similar for comparisons to make 
sense, or are sufficiently dis-similar and complementary for merger to 
make sense. Institutions have different roles, some deliberately set as mis-
sion statements while other roles are the products of history; others still are 
the unfortunate consequence of institutional drift. Institutions are different 
in terms of size and location. They are different in terms of organizational 
complexity, which is not necessarily determined by size. They may be dif-
ferent in terms of cost structures. They are different in terms of programs 
and of markets for those programs. They are different in terms of quality. 
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In the first instance these are factors that a college or university 
should take into account in deciding whether or not to consider merger. 
For example, if it appears through reliable comparison that the problems 
facing a particular institution are endemic, or that a given institution is 
performing as well as other institutions, the benefits of merger might be 
quite limited. 
Assuming in the second instance that merger does appear to hold 
possibility for the given institution, all of these are factors that the col-
lege or university should take into account in appraising possible part-
ners for merger. The practical question that follows is about the ways 
and means of making such an appraisal reliably. 
An obvious, although frequently overlooked, matter of fact is that 
institutions are not systems, and vice versa. Institutions often have cer-
tain characteristics because of the systems of which they are a part. Even 
institutions that are afforded high degrees of autonomy sometimes are 
defined in certain respects by the public jurisdictions in which they are 
located. Institutional mergers, then, cannot in all cases occur without ref-
erence to system structures and policies even if the institutions involved 
enjoy high levels of autonomy. If certain conditions apply to all institu-
tions in a system, they will apply to any putatively new institutions that 
are formed by merger. In other words, it is not possible for a college or 
university to "merge" its way out of a system. 
But if one asks whether or not a given system of higher education is 
becoming more or less diverse, a logical connection to peer selection and 
merger emerges. Systems can change, first, in two ways: they can add or 
remove institutions or the existing institutions in them can change. 
Institutional change, in turn, can involve three further possibilities. The 
array of institutions can remain the same while individual institutions 
become more diverse internally. The number of institutions can grow, 
with the new institutions introducing the desired diversity. Or institutions 
can merge or, more likely, be forced by government to merge. 
In the absence of absolute standards or frames of reference in higher 
education for the evaluation of institutional performance, governors and 
administrators understandably tend to turn to the behaviour of other 
institutions, either individually or as a group, to establish norms for 
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guidance. Management of higher education is plagued by the "How 
much is enough?" question. There are no convenient algorithms to deter-
mine, for examples, what percentage of an institution's budget should be 
spent on library acquisitions or how much should be budgeted to pro-
duce a given number of instructional hours, or indeed how much diver-
sity is optimal. 
This is an important question in regard to mergers. One of the more 
salient reasons for the merger of institutions is to increase diversity, par-
ticularly at a lower cost than would be incurred by each institution's act-
ing alone. Increasing diversity in this context might mean, for example, 
adding academic programs or library collections. This is a reason for 
governments to support mergers as well as for individual institutions to 
seek them. Some "how much is enough" inquiries about diversity sug-
gest counter-intuitive results in regard to mergers. On the one hand, for 
example, if large institutions are more differentiated, and large, complex 
institutions require greater investments in administration because com-
plexity is more difficult to manage (Berdahl, 2000; Blau, 1994; Callan, 
1994), then reducing the cost of administration in the name of efficiency 
can discourage diversity. 
This leads to a great and growing dilemma for the future of merger. 
Efficiency and economy are among the strongest reasons for merger. So, 
which performance is more important: administrat ive eff ic iency or 
diversity, and which can be best pursued through merger? This is a 
dilemma because of the inverse relationship between the costs of diver-
sity and the costs of the management that diversif icat ion requires. 
Merger could have one future or the other but usually not both. 
There are a number of quite different ways that administrators and 
policy-makers may attempt to address this question. One of the most 
straightforward is to examine the degree of diversity that is already 
being managed by the institutions considering a merger. Is that level of 
diversity being managed well? If it is, how much spare capacity for man-
aging further diversity will be available after the merger, or is manage-
ment an area that merger is being undertaken to reduce? 
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THE FUTURE OF MERGER WHEN MERGER WONT WORK 
Although the track record of merger contains more successes than 
failures (Eastman & Lang, 2001) it is not a record that can commend 
merger universally. Sometimes merger either does not work or, at least, 
does not work any better than other forms of cooperation among col-
leges and universities. If the motivating theme of merger in higher edu-
cation is more of ten than not economy and efficiency, the case for 
merger, even when other educational objectives are involved, finally 
rests on less costly means of realizing those objectives. 
Mergers do not always result in greater diversity. One reason for this 
has already been discussed: diversification demands intensified and, 
sometimes, specialized management that poorly matched mergers either 
cannot deliver or can deliver only at higher administrative cost. Another 
reason is that some mergers, in terms of the institutional characteristics 
that normally define diversity, gravitate towards one or the other, but not 
both, of the institutions that merge. In Lynn Meek's assessment, that is 
what happens in most mergers between colleges and universities: 
In [U.K.] university/col lege mergers, the outcome of merger is 
always a university. Since the university is usually the most 
powerful partner in a merger, the success of a university/college 
merger largely depends on the attitudes adopted by university 
personnel. Warwick, Exeter and Loughborough have produced 
successful mergers because university leaders believed in the 
potential benefits of the merger and saw that the acquisition of a 
college would give them the opportunity to pursue activities oth-
erwise closed to the university (Meek, 1988). 
The mergers of which Meek spoke would be regarded as successful 
in the sense that the merged institutions are still in place, and are finan-
cially viable, often because of the efficiencies that merger made possi-
ble. But the consequence of mergers that take this course is less 
diversity. This may be the case in some of the mergers that were man-
dated by government in South Africa (Jansen, 2002). 
So, if it is accepted that efficiency and diversity are the two principal 
factors that motivate merger, it should not be surprising that the move 
towards merger is slowing in some jurisdictions (Martin & Samels, 2002). 
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What, then, are some of the areas in which merger is less effective, and 
what are the alternatives for those areas? 
When Institutional Cultures Conflict 
There is sometimes a tendency to take a romantic view of mergers 
— to regard them as "marriages of equals '" that bring forward the "best 
of both" and allow "two to live as cheaply as one." That is one possible 
outcome of merger, provided that there are high levels of commonality 
of purpose, mutual understanding and good will between the parties and 
sustained and effective communication throughout the process. Just as 
often, however, mergers give rise to confusion and conflict (Martin & 
Samels, 2002; Soobrayan, 2002). Precisely because no party dominates, 
issues may proliferate, fester and remain unresolved. Depending on the 
cost structures and markets of the merging institutions, two might not be 
able to live as cheaply as one, and the costs of management may rise as 
the new institution is more complex but not necessarily cheaper to run. 
A study of the financial services industry by the American Bankers 
Association and Ernst & Whinney found that cultural blending strategies 
associated with mergers of putative equals often precipitated severe con-
flict between merger partners. Buono and Bowditch illustrated what can 
happen with reference to the case of two law firms. 
[T]he two firms initially appeared initially to be a model for 
law-firm combinations. The union was friendly, a managing 
partner was assigned as a mediator to help resolve internal dis-
putes and each firm's partners admitted that the time had come 
to 'inculcate some new values.' Within a year after the merger, 
however, instead of 'blending together,' post-combination inter-
actions were described as tension laden and confrontational. As 
a result, the billing system broke down, the managing partner 
who was supposed to resolve internal disputes quit, a number of 
other partners left the firm, taking millions of dollars' worth of 
clients with them, and long-term clients began using other law 
firms. Ironically, it seems that many of the problems were 
related to the cultural blending strategy: since neither firm 
emerged as dominant after the merger, virtually everything — 
from pay scales and whose clerks and secretaries would be dis-
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXIU, No. 3, 2003 
The Future of Merger 3 5 
missed to which associates would be asked to leave — had to be 
negotiated. Instead of exchanging values and selecting the best 
features of each firm, the process broke down as the cultures 
repeatedly clashed with each other. (Buono & Bowditch, 1989) 
One alternative to the conflict of cultures may be along the lines of 
Meek's observation about the success of mergers in the U.K.: allow one 
culture to dominate. Another alternative, which was deployed in some 
mergers in Canada, is to allow the smaller or less predominant institution 
a degree of internal autonomy, either through modifications in gover-
nance or through some version of "flow through" Responsibility Centre 
Budgeting (Eastman & Lang, 2001). If governments are indirectly par-
ties to merger they can protect the minority partners by providing ear-
marked funding as if the partners were still autonomous This results in a 
degree of semi-autonomy. For example, when the Osgoode Hall School 
of Law merged with York University in Ontario, the government contin-
ued to provide such grants. Also in Ontario, the affiliated campuses of 
Laurentian University, a small institution in the province's relatively 
unpopulated north, receive separate earmarked funding but are academi-
cally accountable to their host university. 
But sometimes none of those alternatives works. In public systems of 
postsecondaiy education, an alternative to merger can at the same time be 
simpler and more radical: close an institution or, more probable, close a 
program and reassign responsibility to another institution. A plausible case 
can be made that a number of mergers in The Netherlands and Australia 
were of this ilk (Goedegebuure, 1992; Harman, 1989). In both jurisdic-
tions the government's official position was that institutions of a certain 
scale or less were not forced to merge, but if they did not, their funding 
would be withdrawn or cut-back. (Dawkins, 1987; Deetman, 1983). 
This alternative does not imply that the future of merger is bleak. 
What it implies is twofold. First, the form of merger may in the future tend 
towards take-overs and acquisitions as those terms are already understood 
in the for-profit corporate sector. Second, in the case of mergers among 
public colleges and universities, especially mergers that are promoted or 
mandated by government, some a priori action by government might be 
required to define the course that mergers should take. For example, two 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXIII, No. 3, 2003 
38 Daniel W. Lang 
institutions may be called on to merge but only after government deter-
mines that, in the course of merger, some programs will be discontinued or 
transferred to other institutions. In Ontario, in the early days of discussions 
about what in the end was the merger of the University of Toronto and the 
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, the provincial government con-
sidered just such a plan (Eastman & Lang, 2001). 
When Economy of Scale Is Misunderstood 
Economy of scale, which is the basic concept behind the efficiency 
of merger, is not infinite. There is a certain generic logic to this. In 
higher education, economy of scale favours larger institutions. There is, 
both in theory and in practice, an upper limit to the inverse correlation 
between institutional size and unit costs but the available evidence indi-
cates that this upper limit is very high (Schumacher, 1983). The most 
recent studies of the correlation between institutional size and unit costs 
indicate that beyond enrolments of about 20,000, increases in size do not 
lead to greater efficiency (Patterson 1999; Toutkoushian 1999). Thus 
there is little history of mergers among very large institutions, although 
some large institutions participate in consortia and federations. Indeed, 
some of the world's largest universities are federations, for examples, the 
University of London and the University of Toronto. 
A graphic representation of economy of scale is a reversed letter J. 
Unit costs decline along the longer upward leg of the J as volume 
expands, thus approaching the bottom or curved portion of the backward 
J. However, as volume expands further, unit costs begin to rise again, 
along the shorter upward curve of the reversed J. Merger, as a means of 
realizing efficiency, works until the expansion of volume begins to drive 
unit costs up again. After that the marginal value of merger begins to 
decline. This portends several possibilities for the future of merger. 
The first is obvious: to the extent that a search for reduced costs dri-
ves institutions and governments towards merger, there will be less inter-
est in merger. The second is that mergers aimed at e f f ic iency and 
economy may shift to emphasize the maximization of revenue through 
merger. An example from Canada is that as programs in Nursing have 
moved from community colleges to universities through merger (another 
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term for this in Canada is "articulation") tuition fees have risen to the 
university level. 
Third: diversification will become the dominant purpose of merger. If 
diversification becomes the dominant purpose for merger, merger might 
become less popular because there are other forms of inter-institutional coop-
eration that can produce as much diversity as mergers, but without the irrevo-
cable finality and loss of identity that accompany merger (Lang, 2002). 
There might be a fourth but much less obvious future. Just as there is 
an optimal size of institution in terms of economies of scale, there may be 
an optimal scale of formal systems of higher education. There are some 
voices that argue that public systems of higher education are becoming 
too big, too highly centralized, and too complex to be managed success-
f u l l y by a n y o n e ( B e r d a h l , 2 0 0 0 ; C a l l a n , 1994; Ga i the r , 1999; 
MacTaggart, 1996). Recalling that merger occupies a place on a contin-
uum with other forms of inter-institutional combination (Lang, 2002), one 
might expect merger to evolve towards the end of the continuum where 
highly organized systems are located. Those systems might be reduced in 
scale and complexity through mergers that form smaller, more specialized 
"mini-systems" that are more homogeneous than heterogeneous. 
Finally, if economy of scale as it applies to mergers is better under-
stood, the expectations for merger may change with the result that inter-
est in other forms of inter-institutional combination may grow. There is 
an assumption, often made but infrequently acknowledged, that the prin-
ciple of economy of scale is not only infinite but applies to ail costs. It 
doesn't. Libraries, information systems, fund raising and development, 
building operation, maintenance, and depreciation are examples of major 
cost centres that are largely fixed. These costs are not reduced in merger. 
They are simply added together in the budget of the merged institution. 
The significance of this is that whatever percentage of saving economy 
of scale might produce in a merger applies only to a subset of costs, per-
haps as little as 50 to 60% of total cost. 
With that lesson learned, colleges, universities, and governments 
that contemplate merger might look to other forms of partnership, like 
consortia, that can focus on specific areas in which the principle of 
economy of scale does apply. 
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CONCLUSION: THE EFFICIENCY - DIVERSITY TRADE-OFF 
Diversity is neither infinitely valuable, nor affordable, nor manage-
able: there can be too much diversity just as there can be too little. This 
poses problems for at least three critical areas of public policy towards 
higher education: planning, regulation, and funding. It also poses prob-
lems for institutions that are considering merger and for public systems 
that are seeking greater diversity and rationalization by promoting merg-
ers. It is at this point that diversity begins to share some characteristics 
with the ways and means by which colleges and universities identify 
their peers and, in the case of voluntary mergers, their partners for 
merger. In the case of involuntary mergers, these ways and means inform 
governments about the shape and diversity of systems of postsecondary 
education that they deploy merger to create. So, what mergers do is often 
the result of how institutions are selected for merger. 
If that selection is done well, there can be two beneficial results. The 
first is that efficiency and diversity may not have to be traded-off against 
one another. Diversity may produce efficiency as the marginal costs of 
expand ing p rograms and services are min imized through merger . 
Efficiency may make more diversity possible. 
The second beneficial result is that more mergers will be stable and 
long-lasting. Those characteristics are more important for diversity than 
for e f f ic iency for most publ ic ly funded col leges and univers i t ies . 
Mergers for efficiency often have a "the Devil made me do it" dimen-
sion. Mergers for diversification are more fundamental and require 
greater acceptance at the grassroots of colleges and universities. Thus, 
while diversification mergers may be more complex and difficult to 
implement, they are also more likely to produce permanent results. 
There is a big if: "IF the selection is done well." One reason for the 
emphasis here on diversity and the use of peer selection methodologies to 
select institutions for benchmarking and merger is that so far this has not 
always been done well or, in some cases of government mandated merg-
ers, done at all. There are methods for making these selections (Lang, 
2000) The future of merger, especially the future that aims to balance 
efficiency and diversity, may include greater attention to those methods. 
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Forecasting the future of mergers in higher education depends to a 
considerable degree on two inter-related factors. One comprises the rea-
sons for the interest in merger in the first place, most of which arose in 
the last three decades of the 20th century. The other comprises one 's 
understanding of where merger fits among all of the forms that inter-
institutional cooperation may take. While merger may be the predomi-
nant form that the recent expansion of inter-institutional combination has 
taken, it is not a unique or independent form. It shares a number of fun-
damental characteristics with other forms of cooperation, especially fed-
eration, and evolved from those forms. 
In virtually any case, one should expect the future of merger to have 
an outer, finite limit. There is a point at which the returns from effi-
ciency will begin to diminish as institutional scale reaches optimal lev-
els . T h i s s u g g e s t s , f i r s t , tha t the p r o s p e c t of m e r g e r wil l r ema in 
significant for smaller and more specialized institutions. Second, it sug-
gests that the small, specialized colleges and universities that decide to 
pursue merger will be more likely to seek larger, more comprehensive 
partners than to seek partners among institutions like themselves. The 
reverse is also likely to be the case: in the future larger institutions that 
consider merger will be more interested in gaining curricular specializa-
tion and variety than in real izing economies of scale. If those three 
trends are true, the alternatives to merger, especially affiliation and fed-
eration, may become more attractive than merger. Thus the future might 
hold more inter-institutional cooperation but less merger. 
In forcing merger as part of such rationalization, governments have 
often assumed that merger will lead to greater efficiency and productiv-
ity. Whether or not governments have known enough about costs and 
institutional management to make such an assumption reliably, it too is a 
principle that, like economy of scale, produces fewer returns as systems 
become more rationalized through merger, voluntary or involuntary. 
Given the already great extent of mergers that were either required or 
motivated by the reorganization of systems of higher education, there 
may simply be little room left for more mergers. 
Governments and institutions may be gaining in their understanding 
of what mergers can and cannot deliver. The conclusion to be drawn from 
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this observation is that there might be fewer new mergers in the future but 
their success rates will rise as expectations become more realistic. 
Will anything follow merger as a new form of inter-institutional 
combination? First, merger may evolve to the formation of "mini" sys-
tems of higher education. There is some evidence of this phenomenon 
already. Several of the mergers in the Ne the r l ands and Aust ra l ia 
involved as many as a dozen inst i tut ions. These were somet imes 
described as "conglomerate mergers" (Goedegebuure, 1992). On careful 
examination, however, some of these newly merged universities look 
more like small systems of higher education than like separate and indi-
vidual inst i tut ions. Some of them, part icular ly in Austra l ia , have 
remained geographically dispersed, spreading literally over hundreds of 
kilometers. They are often highly diverse and regional (Harman, 1991). 
They have the characteristics of what some large centralized systems of 
higher education call "segments." They also resemble and behave like 
some large federations or what might be described as "near mergers." 
Given some of the problems that mergers have encountered in gov-
ernance and internal decision-making (Martin & Samels, 2002) the 
future of mergers may include more deployment of financial arrange-
ments like Responsibility Centre Budgeting (Lang, 1999) and other 
"flow through" schemes like management by contract (Lang, 2002). 
Finally, involuntary merger forced and planned by government may 
come to be seen as something other than merger, especially if priority 
shifts from simple cost reduction efficiency to diversity. Efficiency is a 
motivating influence towards merger for both individual institutions — 
public or private — and governments. Although they may measure effi-
ciency differently and seek other means of achieving it, institutions and 
governments both may be drawn to merger because of it. Diversity and 
the institutional forces that lead to it are a different matter. Although 
governments often want diversity, and often seek to get it by requiring or 
inducing mergers, in the end colleges and universities are as inclined to 
compete as to cooperate when expanding programs and thus adding to 
aggregate diversity. The result ineluctably is merger by political force 
majeure. In that case and in generic terms, what happens is a restructur-
ing or rationalization of a public system of higher education by govern-
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ment. This is not merger. It is a new way of balancing efficiency and 
diversity. An apposi te example can be drawn f rom the procurement 
underway now of a new jet fighter aircraft by the United States and sev-
eral other governments, including Canada, in cooperation. The basic idea 
is that a family or "platform" of closely related airplanes can, on the one 
hand, be different enough to meet the various needs of the participating 
military services and, on the other hand, similar enough to capture sig-
nificant economies of scale. When applied to higher education, this idea 
of a "family" of services that are similar enough to reduce costs through 
economies of scale is very much like those systems of colleges and uni-
versities that are being restructured under the outward appearance of a 
series of individual mergers. But merger isn't really the point or the pur-
pose. Instead the point seems to combine eff iciency and diversity by 
centralizing "backroom" utility functions to realize economies of scale, 
while leaving academic programs largely intact within a sort of higher 
educational holding company that is some degree short of true merger. 
This "near merger" has more characteristics of a consortium or a 
federation than of a merger. The lesson for the future might not be that 
mergers can fail, but that even a successful merger may do too much. 
Instead of expanding diversity, some mergers may only trade one kind of 
diversity for another. Future mergers undertaken in the name of effi-
ciency may, first, have large transaction costs that will consume savings 
for several years, and, second, produce savings that are either below 
expectations or no greater than the savings that other, less inclusive, 
forms of partnership could have produced. 
Mergers often force a trade-off between eff ic iency and diversity. 
Because they are total and only rarely reversible (Harman & Robertson-
Cuninghame, 1995), if a merger does not work, it will be difficult if not 
impossible for either partner to return to the status quo ante. In the future 
colleges, universities, and systems that are seeking greater efficiency or 
more diversity might avoid the trade-off by not thinking of merger first. 
Instead the evolving pattern might be a gradual and cautious creep in the 
direction of merger, with some stops along the way at other forms of 
inter-institutional combina t ion .^ 
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